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THE TRUST FUND PROVISION
OF THE MECHANICS' LIEN ACT
J. W. MIK-
Introduction
After a decade of obscurity, the trust fund provision of The
Mechanics' Lien Act' has in recent years increasingly become a
subject of litigation. Its current prominence before the courts is
testimony to the popularity of this sweeping and flexible remedy as
well as to the difficulty inherent in applying the trust concept in
the variety and complexity of commercial transactions. Broadly, the
cases fall into two categories: first, dealing with the situation where
the contractor has made an assignment of the moneys he is to receive
under the contract, and; secondly, where the contractor has paid
those moneys into his overdrawn bank account.
In considering the first situation, the Courts have applied the
rule %emo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet
*J. W. Mik, M.A., is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 R.S.O. 1960, c. 233, s. 3 (1) All sums received by a builder or contractor
or a subcontractor on account of the contract price are and constitute a trust
fund in the hands of the builder or contractor, or of the subcontractor, as
the case may be, for the benefit of the proprietor, builder, or contractor, sub-
contractors, Workmen's Compensation Board, workmen and persons who
have supplied material on account of the contract, and the builder or con-
tractor or the subcontractor, as the case may be, is the trustee of all such
sums so received by him, and until all workmen and all persons who have
supplied material on the contract and all subcontractors are paid for work
done or material supplied on the contract and the Workmen's Compensation
Board is paid any assessment with respect thereto, may not appropriate or
convert any part thereof to his own use or to any use not authorized by the
trust. (This provision first made its appearance in 1942, c. 34, s. 21.)
(2) Every builder, contractor or subcontractor who appropriates or con-
verts any part of the contract price referred to in subsection 1 to his own
use or to any use not authorized by the trust is guilty of an offence and on
summary conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $5,000 or to imprison-
ment for a term of not more than two years or both, and every director or
officer of a corporation who knowingly assents to or acquiesces in any such
offence by the corporation is guilty of such offence in addition to the cor-
poration.
(3) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, where a builder,
contractor or subcontractor has paid in whole or part for any materials
supplied on account of the contract, or any workman or subcontractor who
has performed any work or services or placed or furnished any material
in respect of such contract, the retention by such builder, contractor or sub-
contractor of any amount so paid by him shall not be deemed an appropria-
tion or conversion thereof to his own use or any use not authorized by the
trust. (This provision was added to the Act in 1952, c. 54, s. 1.)
See also the Mechanics' Lien Act of British Columbia (s. 3), New Bruns-
wick (s. 2A), and the Manitoba Builders and Workmen Act (s. 3).
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and held that the fund remains subject to the trust: lack of knowledge
on the part of the assignee of the breach of trust is not material in
the face of the rule that assignments are subject to equities. The
question of how much knowledge is necessary to constitute partici-
pation in a breach of trust and what is the nature of the trust created
by s. 3 of The Mechanics' Lien Act arises with full force where the con-
tractor, who is operating a current account at an overdraft, receives
payment on the construction project and, without paying his sub-
contractors, suppliers or workmen, deposits the money at the bank,
which applies it against the overdraft. Federal banking legislation
providing that a bank is not obliged to see to the execution of a trust
has not proven to be a decisive factor in the solution of this particular
problem, which has fallen to be decided by the common law. The
general principle arrived at by the courts is that where money is paid
into a bank account in the ordinary course of business, in a banker-
customer relationship, the bank, in the absence of knowledge of the
breach of trust, takes free of the trust.
Several incidental problems such as the independence of this
remedy from the other provisions of The Mechanics' Lien Act, the
apportionment of trust funds, at what point of time the trust arises,
and to what moneys the trust will attach, have also been the subject
of judicial consideration. Surprisingly, the consideration devoted to
the nature of the trust created by the Act has been in inverse pro-
portion to the prolific litigation, and, apart from some dicta in a few
cases, the courts have contented themselves with the mechanical
application of the rules stated above. The question whether the trust
created by s. 3 is a statutory trust or a creature of equity-assuming
that there is a distinction between the two-remains to be canvassed
by the courts. If a claimant under s. 3 has a right to all the benefits
and protection which courts of equity have traditionally accorded to
the cestui que trust, and the contractor is subject to all the duties of
the traditional trustee in his dealing with moneys received on a con-
struction contract, the consequences will be far reaching indeed.
An attempt will be made through a consideration of the individual
problems raised in the reported cases to analyze some of the salient
features of the trust created by The Mechanics' Lien Act and their
consequences.
Assignments of Moneys Due Under a Contract
In Minneapolis-Honeywell Ltd. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. Ltd.2
I & R had obtained a subcontract to install heating plants in four
schools for which M-H supplied the automatic heating controls. E
was I & R's principal supplier on this and other contracts and had
obtained from them an assignment of all present and future book
accounts as security for an indebtedness of $20,000. Notice of the
assignment was given to the general contractor and subsequent pay-
2 [19551 S.C.R. 694, 3 D.L.R. 561. See also, Maxwell Bruce, Case and
Comment (1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. 855.
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ments were made by cheque payable to I & R and E jointly. The
practice was for the parties to decide together what accounts of I & R
should be paid, and then the surplus was applied against the indebted-
ness to E. M-H, who had not been paid, lost its right to a lien by
failure to file a claim within the prescribed time, but, when I & R
went into liquidation asserted that the moneys received by E under
the assignment were trust funds by virtue of s. 19 of the British
Columbia Mechanics' Lien Act3 and claimed an accounting. The appel-
lant was successful at trial4 but the decision was reversed on appeal.5
O'Halloran and Sidney Smith JJ.A. held that any rights which s. 19
purported to give could be invoked only by a person who was at the
time of the institution of the action entitled to a lien upon the
property in respect of which the work had been done or the materials
supplied.6 The Supreme Court of Canada7 was unanimous in holding
that the rights created by s. 19 were independent of the right to a
lien under the Act.8 Speaking for the majority Rand J. stated that
by dint of s. 19 "the contractor and subcontractor are made trustees
of the contract moneys and the trust continues while employees,
materialmen or others remain unpaid".9 The appellants were, there-
fore, cestuis que trustent of the moneys received by the subcontrac-
tor. E, as assignee of the moneys from I & R, acted through the right
and power of the assignor and must either see to the satisfaction of
the rights under the trust or run the peril of participating in a breach
of it. "If this were not so, the entire purpose of the section could be
nullified by an assignment contemporaneous with the contract". 10
Locke J. dissented on the grounds that the trust attached only to
moneys actually received by the subcontractor, but because of the
assignment, the moneys did not come into his hands. Rand J., how-
ever, declared:
I cannot interpret the word "received" in s. 19 as not including money
paid to an assignee. The money "received" on account of the contract is
the same as that paid by the contractor: payment the correlative of
receipt. The assignee acts through the right and power of the assignor;
and the receipt by him is likewise that by the creditor.11
In the Supreme Court of Ontario, LeBel J. independently and
contemporaneously arrived at the same conclusion. In Bank of Mont-
3 R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 205.
4 [1954) 1 D.L.R. 678, 11 W.W.R. (N.S.) 212 (B.C. S.C.).
5 [19541 4 D.L.R. 800, 13 W.W.R. (N.S.) 449 (B.C. C.A.).
6 13 W.W.R. 449, at pp. 453, 464.
7 Supra, footnote 2.
8 [1955] S.C.R. 694, at p. 703 per Locke J. "I find no ambiguity in the
language of s. 19 and, while the adding of this additional protection for
the interests of labourers and materialmen may create difficulties for con-
tractors seeking credit, as pointed out by Richards J.A. in Castelein v. Boux
(at p. 106) and while the section lacks any direction as to the manner in
which the trust fund declared is to be apportioned among those entitled,
these considerations do not, in my opinion, afford any sufficient reason for
failing to give effect to the plain meaning of the language employed or to
read into the section a provision that the rights given may be exercised only
by those who then have a right to a lien upon the work."
9 Ibid., at p. 696.
10 Ibid., at p. 697. Followed in RoyaZ Bank of Canada v. BZick (1963), 39
D.L.R. (2d) 36 (Man. C.A.).
11 Ibid.
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real v. Township of idney,12 a contractor who had made an assign-
ment in favour of the bank prior to entering into a contract with
a municipality to construct a drain, became bankrupt before comple-
tion of the work, and was indebted to the bank as well as to subcon-
tractors. The municipality having paid the holdback into the court,
the bank asserted priority over the subcontractors on the basis that
it took its assignment for valuable consideration without notice of
any claim against the contractor. 13 The learned trial judge found the
bank's contention startling since if it were given effect to, claims for
liens could be defeated by the simple expedient of the contractor
assigning the moneys payable to him under his contract before the
first lien arose. LeBel J. considered the various safeguards for sub-
contractors, workmen and suppliers created by The Mechanics' Lien
Act14 and observed that:
As a further safeguard for the benefit of those the Act is designed to
protect, all moneys received by the contractor from the person primarily
liable are, by s. 3, expressly said to be and to constitute a trust fund in his
hands for the benefit of those other persons. Until those persons have
been paid, he must not appropriate or convert any part of it to his own
use or any use not authorized by the trust.15
The trial judge concluded:
It is unnecessary to consider whether the assignment to the Bank
amounted to an appropriation or conversion in this case, because it Is
plain that any sum received by a builder or contractor on account of
the contract price does not become his property "until all workmen and
all persons who have supplied material on the contract and all sub-
contractors are paid for work done or materials supplied on the contract".
An assignor may not give his assignee a better title to property than he
has himself.16
Litigation has continued over the meaning of the phrase "all
sums received by a builder or contractor or a subcontractor on ac-
count of the contract price". In Royal Bank of Canada v. Blick,
Wilson et al.,1 7 the subcontractor had failed to complete a contract
for R, which was itself a subcontractor, on a building project for
the University of Manitoba. Before entering into the contract, R had
obtained from another party, B, a collateral guarantee of perform-
ance of the contract and now required him to complete it. When, on
completion of the project, R received payment, there arose a com-
petition between the bank, claiming through an assignment of book
debts from the subcontractor, the workmen of the subcontractor, who
relied on s. 3 of the Builders and Workmen Act,18 and B who claimed
to be subrogated to the rights of R. R paid the balance of the money
into court. Freedman J.A. stated that the rights and obligations
12 [1955] O.W.N. 581 (Ont. H.C.).
13 LeBel J. pointed out that the bank could not have had notice of a lien
before such lien arose, but it did know that its assignment was of moneys
payable under a building contract for the construction of a municipal drain:
mechanics' liens were thus a definite possibility.
14 R.S.O. 1950, c. 227.
15 Supra, footnote 12, at p. 583.
16 Ibid., at p. 584.
17 (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 36 (Man. C.A.).
18 R.S.M. 1954, c. 28.
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arising under s. 3 are referable only to the specific contract affecting
the parties. 19 The workmen claiming under s. 3 were not parties to
a contract with R. The obligations of the subcontractor under s. 3
would not arise until moneys were in fact "received" by the subcon-
tractor. The subcontractor, by his abandonment of the contract prior
to completion, was precluded from claiming the trust money held by
R to the extent necessary to complete the contract.20 The cost of
completion was deducted before arriving at the amount payable to
the subcontractor and B could claim this deduction by subrogation
to R's rights. The surplus was distributed among claimants under s. 3
in priority to the bank.
Where money is paid into court by an owner and there are con-
flicting claims against the funds by a judgment creditor of the con-
tractor and suppliers and workmen who rely on the trust fund pro-
vision of the Act, the money is "received" on account of the contract
price and is subject to the trust.21 There is no difference in substance
between the owner paying the money into court by agreement with
the contractor and then the judgment creditor obtaining an order
for payment out to him of the money in court, and on the other hand
the contractor assigning the money to his judgment creditor and the
owner then paying the money to the judgment creditor direct.
22
Where, however, the money has not been paid into court and the
judgment creditor obtains a garnishment order against the money
owed by the owner on the contract, the trust does not arise in favour
of the suppliers and workmen of the contractor because it is not
money which has been "received" by him on account of the contract
price.2 3
It would ... be most unreasonable and oppressive, as well as contrary
to the usual notions of a trust, to make the contractor a trustee of the
contract price before he has received it, and no less unreasonable and
oppressive to make the owner a trustee of the contract price for the
bare reason that he owed it.24
19 Supra, footnote 17, at p. 40.
20 Len Ariss & Co. v. Peioso et aZ., [1958] O.R. 643, 14 D.L.R. (2d) 178
(Ont. C.A.).
21 Be Watson and Murchison (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 1047 (B.C. S.C.);
Edwards WeZding Limited v. Howe & Wilson Construction Limited (1959), 27
W.W.R. 689 (B.C. Cty. Ct.).
22 Re Watson and Murchison, supra, footnote 21, at p. 1054, per Atkins J.
23 Castelein v. Boux (1934), 42 Man. R. 97, 3 D.L.R. 351 (Man. C.A.).
24 ibid., D.L.R. at p. 352 per Prendergast C.J.M. In a dissenting judgment
Dennistoun J.A., concurring with Robson J.A., stated: "The moment the
defendant [the contractor] stretches out his hand to touch these moneys
and exercise an act of ownership over them, they are as much in his posses-
sion as if in his bank account. A creditor can have no higher right by means
of execution over the property of his debtor than the debtor himself has,
and if the debtor has no power to alienate the fund from the preferred
creditors, the execution creditor can have none."
Richards J.A., who concurred with the majority, recognized (at p. 358)
the "great force" of the dissenting judgments, "but the conclusion arrived
at would have such far reaching effects in limiting and lessening the neces-
sary credits to many builders and contractors, who have in the past obtained
legitimate loans on the security of contracts, that it would be difficult for
them to carry on their important businesses". Similar solicitous concern was
[footnote continued on next page.]
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It is difficult to discover a satisfactory basis of distinction between
these cases, and to reconcile Castelein v. Boux25 with the purpose of
the trust fund provision as expressed in Minneapolis-Honeywell Ltd.
v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. Ltd.,26 Bank of Montreal v. Township of
Sidney,27 and numerous other cases. 28 The case was relied upon by
Locke J. in his dissenting judgment in the Minneapolis-Honeywell29
decision to support his contention that the contract moneys had not
been "received" by the contractor. It was not, however, expressly
overruled by the terse majority decision delivered by Rand J. and
has been subsequently referred to with approval by the Manitoba
Court of Appeal30 and distinguished without reasons in the Supreme
Court of British Columbia.31
There is one exception to the rule that a charging order cannot
be made against money which has been paid into court and is subject
to the statutory trust created by s. 3(1). In Re L & D Cartage and
Development Co. Ltd. v. Sterling Construction Co. Ltd.,32 the bank-
rupt subcontractor recovered $34,713.59 from the contractor in a
mechanics' lien action, in which the supplier to the subcontractor and
a bank holding an assignment of book debts closely co-operated. The
subcontractor's solicitor was entitled to charge his costs, which were
slightly more than the judgment paid into court, against the fund,
notwithstanding that it was "a trust fund.., for the benefit of...
expressed by the Canadian Bankers Association in a brief they submitted to
the Standing Committee on Banking on Dec. 10, 1963, calling for the repeal
of s. 3 of the Ontario Mechanics' Lien Act. (See (1964), 22 U of T Fac L R
107). In view of the fact that Toronto ranked third among the cities on the
continent in the number of building permits issued in 1964, these dire
consequences do not appear to have materialized.
25 Supra, footnote 23.
26 [1955] S.C.R. 694, 3 D.L.R. 351.
27 Supra, footnote 12.
28 Beaver Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Sieffert, Villeneuve et al. (1965), 48 D.L.R.
(2d) 146 where Smith J. at p. 152 stated: "Insofar as the effect of s. 3 of
the Builders and Workmen Act is concerned, I see no difference between the
position of a garnishor and that of an assignee, or a trustee in bankruptcy".
The judgment was affirmed by the Manitoba Court of Appeal on the grounds
that the registered lienholders had priority over the garnishee as regards
the moneys as yet unpaid on the contract (See The Mechanics' Lien Act,
R.S.O. 1960, c. 233, s. 13(1), for the parallel Ontario provision), but Guy J.A.
who delivered the principal judgment stated at (1965), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 155,
"Although I have arrived at the same result as did Smith J., he did so
by reason of the effect of the Builders and Workmen Act. Since the matter
can, in my opinion be adequately decided on the basis of the Mechanics'
Lien Act, it is unnecessary for me to consider the ground upon which Smith
J. disposed the matter". It is submitted that the Manitoba Court of Appeal
is dragging its feet and that CasteZein v. Boux, supra, footnote 23, would not
be followed elsewhere.
29 See footnote 2.
30 RoyaZ Bank of Canada v. BZick, supra, footnote 17.
31 Be Watson and Murchison, supra, footnote 21.
32 (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 726 (Ont. H.C.).
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all persons who have supplied material on the contract 33 and not-
withstanding the assignment of book debts to the bank.34
These cases illustrate the difficulty in arriving at a precise defini-
tion of the nature of the trust, to what it attaches and when it comes
into existence. When money is paid into court or to the contractor
there is a readily ascertainable sum to which the trust can attach.
From the wording of s. 3(1) it appears immaterial that the sum
received by the contractor or paid into court on account of the
contract price is in excess of the amount actually owing to unpaid
suppliers or workmen. The section categorically states:
Al sums received by a builder or contractor ... on account of the con-
tract price are and constitute a trust fund in the hands of the builder or
contractor ... and the builder or contractor ... is a trustee of aUl
such sums received by him, and ... may not appropriate or convert
any part thereof to his own use or to any use not authorized by the trust.35
Since in most cases the moneys received by the contractor will
not be the exact amount owed to subcontractors and materialmen,
and the Legislature cannot be taken to intend that a supplier should
be beneficially entitled to more than what is owing to him, the trust
would appear to be in the nature of a charge or lien against the fund,
or to rephrase the concept, what is created by s. 3(1) is a charge
or lien in the nature of a trust against money received by a con-
tractor.36 The other possible approach to this problem would be to
33 The Mechanics' Lien Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 233, s. 3(1).
34 - Or Bien, sans crier davantage,
Rapportons-nous, dit-elle, A Raminagrobis.
C'Ltait un Chat, vivant comme un d~vot ermite,
Un Chat faisant la chattemite,
Un saint homme de Chat, bien fourth, gros et gras,
Arbitre expert sur tous les cas.
Jean Lapin pour juge l'agr~e.
Les voilb tous deux arrivdes
Devant sa majest6 fourr~e.
Grippeminaud leur dit: Mes enfants approchez,
Approchez, je suis sourd, les ans en sont la cause.
L'un et l'autre approcha, ne craignant nulle chose.
Aussit6t qu'A porte, Il vit les contestants,
Grippeminaud, le bon ap6tre,
Jetant des deux c6t~s la griffe en meme temps,
Mit les plaideurs d'accord en croquant 'un et l'autre.
La Fontaine, Fables, Livre VII, xvi "Le Chat, la Belette et le Petit
Lapin". 11. 32-45.
35 R.S.O. 1960, c. 233, s. 3(1). Italics mine.
36 In a situation similar to those already considered, the Alberta Supreme
Court arrived at the same result without relying on the trust fund provision
which does not appear in the Alberta Act. See Oil Well Supply Company v.
Bank of Nova Scotia, [19511 2 W.W.R. (N.S.) 554 (Alta. C.A.). A subcon-
tractor completed the drilling of an oil well and filed a mechanics' lien. The
owner paid the moneys due on the contract into court. The Bank of Nova
Scotia claimed all the moneys due under the contract by virtue of an
assignment executed by the contractors before the commencement of drilling.
O'Connor C.J. decided that the bank was in no better position than the
contractor and was not entitled to payment of the moneys under the
contract unless and until the owner has received satisfactory evidence that
all the bills for material and labour, i.e. all mechanics' liens, have been
paid in full. Followed in Be Bishop, Rowe & Spaitk Construction Co. Ltd.
(1961), 35 W.W.R. 20 (Alta. S.C.). The reasoning on which such a conclusion
is based is stated by Riley J. in The Pedlar People Ltd. v. MeMahon Plastering
[footnote continued on next page.]
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say that the contractor receives trust money mingled with his own
money and the Courts in considering the use of the mixed fund
achieve a rough sort of justice by the application of the principle in
Ha~ltt's case;37 however, such an interpretation would not accord
with the express words of s. 3(1). It is clear from the result of
numerous reported cases, that this charge in the nature of a trust
will attach to the fund as soon as it comes into existence whether by
payment to the contractor, payment into court38 or by payment to
a third party by virtue of an assignment by the contractor.3 9 What
of the situation where the money has not yet been paid and there
is no fund in existence to which the charge can attach? It is not a
very satisfactory comment on the state of the law when a judgment
creditor of a contractor can successfully garnish moneys owing on
the contract by the owner to the contractor,40 yet if that money had
been paid into court a charging order obtained by the judgment
creditor would be of no avail against the claims of unpaid material-
men.41 If Rand J.42 and LeBel J.43 were correct in stating the policy
behind the trust provision of The Mechanics' Lien Act, would it not
be consistent with that policy to hold that this charge in the nature
of a trust attaches to the debt owed by the owner to the contractor,
and when that debt is rectified by payment, then to that specific fund?
There is one anomalous decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal 44
which is irreconcilable with the Minneapolis-Honeywell line of auth-
ority. F sold a prefabricated steel building to B subject to a con-
ditional sales contract which was assigned to IAC. A supplied the
steel and constructed the building and then relying on s. 3 of The
Mechanics' Lien Act45 claimed that IAC, as an assignee, stood in
the same position as F, and had become a statutory trustee for all
moneys received by it. The court rejected this argument on the
grounds that IAC was not a builder or contractor, or subcontractor
within the meaning of those words as used in s. 3 and IAC did not
fall within the scope of that section.46 On the other hand, it might
Co. Ltd. (1961), 34 W.W.R. 315 (Alta. S.C.), at p. 318. "There is no spelcal
lien created against the holdback, but if a lien exists under s. 6 then that
lien, which is primarily a charge against the land is also a charge against
the fund". The circumstances in which this approach will afford protection
to the supplier or subcontractor are clearly more limited than the effect
of s. 3(1).
37 (1880), 13 Ch. D. 696, 49 L.J. Ch. 61.
38 Royal Bank of Canada v. Blick, supra, footnote 17; Bank of Montreal
v. Township of Sidney, supra footnote 12; Re Evans Coleman and Evans
Limited v. R. A. Nelson donstruwtion Limited (1958), 25 W.W.R. 569
(B.C. S.C.).
39 Minneapolis-Honeywell Ltd. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. Ltd., supra,
footnote 2.
40 Castelein v. Boux, supra, footnote 23.
41 Edwards Welding Limited v. Howe & Wilson Construction Limited,
supra, footnote 21.
42 See Minneapolis-Honeywell Ltd. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. Ltd., supra,
footnote 2.
43 See Bank of Montreal v. Township of Sidney, supra, footnote 12.
44 Argus Steel Const. Ltd. v. Burns Transport Ltd., [19621 O.W.N. 153.
45 R.S.O. 1960, c. 233.
46 Argus Steel Const. Ltd. v. Burns Transport Ltd., supra, footnote 44,
at p. 156.
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be observed that a bank is also not a "builder or contractor or sub-
contractor" but, nevertheless, is subject to the statutory trust when
it must claim by virtue of an assignment.47
The results of these decisions show that (a) s. 3 creates rights
which are enforceable in civil proceedings,48 (b) that the right estab-
47 It is an invariable practice in conditional sales agreements for the
purchaser to give a promissory note which is negotiated to a finance com-
pany at the same time as the contract is assigned: Killoran v. MonticelZo
State Bank (1921), 61 S.C.R. 528. The holder in due course of a promissory
note, unlike an assignee, takes free of any equities. A possible explanation
of the case is that the negotiation of the promissory note-the headnote of the
case reads: An assignee of a conditional sale contract given for the price of
building materials and holder in due course of a collateral promissory note
is not a trustee of money paid to him thereunder notwithstanding that such
money is paid out of funds received by the buyer, maker of the note, who
in the circumstances is a statutory trustee thereof for lien holders,-by F
to IAC had the same effect as if the money had been completely paid to F,
the moneys being trust moneys, and then paid out to IAC. Having taken
for value without notice of the breach of trust IAC would not be obliged torepay the money.p8 In Minneapolis-Honeywell v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. Ltd., Davey J.
decided at trial (supra, footnote 4) that the trust fund provision in s. 19
created rights enforceable in civil proceedings. This point was accepted
in the Supreme Court of Canada without argument It is interesting to note
that the New York Court of Appeals, consisting of seven judges, arrived at
the opposite conclusion in Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Federation Bank c§
Trust Co. (1942), 43 N.E. (2d) 486, 288 N.Y. 452. §25(a) of the New York Lien
Law provided: "The funds received by a contractor for a public improvement
are hereby declared to constitute trust funds in the hands of such contractor
to be applied first to the payment of claims of subcontractors, architects,
engineers, surveyors, labourers and materialmen arising out of the improve-
ment, and to the payment of premiums on surety bonds or bonds filed and
premiums on insurance accruing during the making of the improvement and
any contractor and any officer, director or agent of any contractor who applies
or consents to the application of such funds for any other purpose and fails
to pay the claims hereinbefore mentioned is guilty of larceny and punishable
as provided in § 1302 of the penal law". Rippey J. speaking for the court
reasoned: "Nothing in the section bars the contractor from using the moneys
received for any purpose he may see fit provided he does not fail to pay all
such claims out of other moneys which he may then have or which he may
afterwards receive; and nothing in the section bars a banker from applying
moneys, if on deposit in the contractor's account at the bank, without inquiry,
upon the contractor's indebtedness to the bank. It necessarily follows that
no trust arises under that section from the mere fact that the contractor
received and has in his hands moneys in payment on account of a public
improvement ... The purpose of the section as may readily be seen is solely
penal and not to provide civil remedies . . . In clear terms those sections
were not intended to create a real trust fund to remain such under any and
all contingencies from the time the contractor or subcontractor first received
payment on account of public or private improvements respectively ...
The subcontractor's remedy in these cases was to have the district attorney
prosecute the delinquent contractor and collect as a fine the sum diverted
plus 20%; this would be paid over to the injured party. Such remedy is of
dubious value, since in these cases the contractor is invariably bankrupt.
In 1942 the State Legislature amended the law and declared that the relation-
ship between job creditors and job debtors is one of trustee and beneficiary
and that henceforth a civil remedy would exist. q.v. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942,
ch. 808, (2).
Maxwell Bruce (supra, footnote 2) notes that s. 3(2) was added to the
Ontario Mechanics' Lien Act after the Minneapolis-HneyweZl decision and
this raises the question whether the trust fund provision is of a penal nature
and excludes, or includes in addition, a civil remedy. S. 3(1), (2) would now
be the equivalent of the former N.Y. § 25(a). This problem has not material-
ized in subsequent cases before the Supreme Court of Canada.
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lished by s. 3 is independent of the right to a lien by registration
under the Act, (c) that no assignment of money due under the con-
tract can affect the trust fund constituted by the section, and (d)
that when money due under a contract is paid into court, the trust
takes priority over all other charges except a solicitor's lien.
Payment Into a Bank Account in the Ordinary Course of Business
Different considerations arise when the contractor appropriates
trust funds to his own use but does not assign them away. The most
frequently litigated issue is encountered when the moneys are de-
posited by the contractor into an overdrawn bank account. This
situation will be examined with a view to considering (1) the degree
of knowledge required to fix a bank with liability for participation
in a breach of trust; (2) the effect of payment into an overdrawn
bank account in the ordinary course of business; and once again
(3) the nature of the trust created by The Mechanics' Lien Act.
Finally, some attention will be devoted to recent cases where there
is an assignment to a bank of the moneys due under a construction
contract but the proceeds come into the hands of the contractor who
deposits them with the bank.
1. Degree of Knowledge
Where a contractor pays into a bank or otherwise uses for his
own purposes moneys received by him on account of the contract
price, and his suppliers, workmen or subcontractors remain unpaid,
the question arises as to the degree of knowledge of the breach of
trust necessary to make a bank or third party trustee de son tort
for participation in the breach of trust. A knowledge of the trust
character of the moneys is not in itself sufficient to fix the bank or
payee with liability: the bank or payee should also know that the
contractor is in serious financial difficulty and, in diverting the trust
funds, will be unable to pay his subcontractors, suppliers or workmen.
Thus, where a bank manager pressed a contractor for payment of the
amount outstanding in excess of a secured overdraft, and had refused
to honour six cheques drawn by the contractor in favour of suppliers
and workmen during the week preceding the deposit by the con-
tractor of moneys received from persons for whom he had been
building houses, it was held that the bank acted in breach of trust
in applying the money against the overdraft.49 Schroeder J.A., speak-
ing for the Ontario Court of Appeal, pointed out that the bank
manager knew that all the deposits to the contractor's account con-
sisted of money paid by persons for whom the contractor was building
houses. He must be presumed to know the law and realize that by
virtue of s. 3 of The Mechanics' Lien Act50 that money was trust
money. The refusal to pay the six cheques was accepted as evidence
of knowledge that, at the material time, the contractor was in finan-
cial difficulty and there were unpaid accounts due by him for material
49 FonthiZZ Lumber Ltd. vt. Bank of Montreal, [1959] O.R. 451 (Ont. C.A.).
50 R.S.O. 1950, c. 227.
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and for work or services in connection with his building operations.
The learned Justice then concluded that "if A holds property in a
fiduciary capacity as e.g. as a trustee or an agent, and B takes from
A a transfer of the property with knowledge of a breach of duty com-
mitted by A in making the transfer, then B holds the property 'under
a transmitted fiduciary obligation to account for it,' to the cestui que
trust or principal".51
The degree of knowledge required to make a bank a guilty par-
ticipator in a breach of trust is a critical problem 2 in view of federal
banking legislation which provides:
The bank is not bound to see to the execution of any trust, whether
express, implied or constructive, to which any deposit made under the
authority of this Act is subject.5 3
The argument was raised in Fonthill Lumber Ltd. v. Bank of Mont-
rea54 that s. 3 of The Mechanics' Lien Act was in conflict with s.
96 (1) of the Bank Act and the latter as valid federal legislation must
prevail. Schroeder J.A. replied that s. 96 (1)
does not release a bank from liability if it knows not merely of the
existence of the trust, but also of the commission of a breach thereof,
or of circumstances which should put it on inquiry.
If a trustee draws a cheque on a trust account, the bank is not obliged to
make inquiries to determine whether the proceeds of the cheque are to be
applied in accordance with the trust. S. 96(1) has not effected an altera-
tion in the Common Law in relation to cases where the bank has partici-
pated in a breach of trust, or has facilitated the misapplication of trust
funds as, e.g., by knowingly permitting an unauthorized transfer to be
made from a trust account to a trustee's personal account. In such a case
the right of recovery is not founded upon the bank's duty to see to the
execution of a trust, but is based upon equitable principles which ordain
that it would be inequitable and unjust to permit a bank to retain by way
of credit against an overdraft on a personal account, moneys received by
it through its participation in a breach of trust55
The common law position is stated by Lord Herschell in Thomson v.
Clydesdale Bank Limited.5 6
If the person receiving the money has reason to believe that the payment
is being made in fraud of a third person, and that the person making the
payment is handing over in discharge of his debt money which he has
no right to hand over, then the person taking such payment would not be
entitled to retain the money.
The transposition of this principle into the context of The Mech-
anics' Lien Act presents some difficulty. It is submitted that the
51 Supra, footnote 49, at p. 467. See also John Ritchie Ltd. v. Canadian
Bank of Commerce, [19631 2 O.R. 116, reversed on other grounds (1965), 47
D.L.R. (2d) 289; Dominion Bank v. FasseZ & Baglier Construction Company
Limited, [19553 O.W.N. 709 where the issue was avoided by the Court of
Appeal and the case disposed of on the basis of the law of bills of exchange.
Falconbridge, On Banking and Bilts of Exchange, 6ed, p. 619 notes that the
effect of Jones v. Waring, [19263 A.C. 670, seems to have been overlooked
by the Court in deciding the case.
52 Falconbridge, op. cit. pp. 296-99.
53 The Bank Act, S.C. 1953-1954, c. 48, s. 96(1).
54 Supra, footnote 49.
55 Ibid., at p. 471.
56 [1893] A.C. 282, at pp. 287, 288.
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bank must have reason to believe that; (1) the moneys about to be
deposited are the proceeds from a construction contract; (2) the
suppliers and workmen have not been paid; and (3) that the con-
tractor is in financial difficulty and is unlikely to be able to meet his
obligations. The status of all three of these elements is not yet clear,
but it appears settled that knowledge of facts which would give the
bank reason to believe that the moneys about to be deposited are
the proceeds of a construction contract and that suppliers, subcon-
tractors or workmen have not been paid constitutes the minimal
degree of knowledge sufficient to fix a bank with liability for partici-
pation in a breach of trust.57 Unless the bank had reason to believe
that suppliers or workmen had not been paid, it would have no reason
to believe that the moneys were trust funds, or at least that the con-
tractor was making an appropriation not authorized by the trust.
It would not be practicable to insist that a bank enquire every time
a contractor deposited money, whether a trust existed, nor could
such a course be reconciled with s. 96(1) of the Bank Act.58 The
third element in establishing participation in a breach of trust, that
is, knowledge that the contractor is in financial difficulty and is
unlikely to be able to meet his obligations, enjoys a doubtful status.
In the British Columbia Supreme Court 59 Collins J. left open the
possibility that even if the bank knew that all suppliers and sub-
contractors had not been paid but believed that the holdback was
sufficient to take care of their claims, the bank would not be acting
in breach of trust in crediting the deposit to the contractor's account.
In contrast to the position taken by Collins J., Gale J., in John
Ritchie Ltd. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce60 took the view that the
contractor had committed a breach of trust when he deposited pro-
ceeds from a construction contract into his overdrawn account even
though it was his anticipation and intention that he would be ex-
tended credit on which he could draw to pay his subcontractors, and
the bank which was aware of these facts thereby participated in the
57 In practice all three factors have been present, since where a bank
has reason to believe that subcontractors, suppliers or workmen have not
been paid, it is because the contractor is in a precarious financial position.
Knowledge of these two elements is usually deduced from evidence that
the bank refused to honour the cheques drawn by the contractor in favour
of suppliers and workmen, and pressed for payment of an overdraft and/or
refused to extend further credit. See FonthilZ Lumber Ltd. v. Bank of
Montreal, supra, footnote 49; John Ritchie Ltd. v. Canadian Bank of Com.
merce, [19631 2 O.R. 116, reversed by the Ontario Court of Appeal on other
grounds (1965), 47 D.L.R. (2d) 289. Cf. Ross v. Royal Bank of Canada
(1966), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 578 (Ont. H.C.), where the bank successfully deducted
payment for a $45,000 note from the proceeds of a construction contract to
the credit of the contractor's current account, even though it knew the con-
tractor was insolvent. Wells J. (at p. 593) distinguished the Fonthill Lumber
case on the grounds that the company's business "was not confined to con.
tracting, it also had a retail store and it was a varied business in many
ways and the bank manager had no particular knowledge of the source of
any of the moneys which came into the account from which all these sums
were ultimately paid."58 S.C. 1953-1954, c. 48.
59 Canadian Pittsburgh Industries Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1963) 37
D.L.R. (2d) 120 (B.C. S.C.).
60 [1963] 2 O.R. 116. For a comment, see (1964), 3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 116.
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breach of trust. The bank contended at trial, that it could not be
held liable for breach of trust unless it actually knew that the sub-
contractors would not be paid from other progress payments or from
any other source. Gale J. rejected this contention and stated that the
true test was:
Did the bank (1) know that the contractor was committing a breach of
trust, and (2) did it participate therein?61
This test raises more questions than it answers. Unless one adopts
the position that the moment the contractor deposits money received
on a construction contract into his current account, while suppliers
and subcontractors have not been paid, he is guilty of a breach of
trust and subject to the penalty in s. 3(2), even though he intends
to draw cheques on that account to pay suppliers and subcontractors,
or hds other resources from which to pay them, or intends to rely
on the holdback which is sufficient to answer all claims, then the
test is too imprecise to be of much practical value because the answer
to the question whether the bank knew the contractor was commit-
ting a breach of trust, depends on whether the contractor might have
paid the subcontractors from another source. In this case the bank
manager knew that the subcontractors were pressing his customer
for payment of their accounts and that it had been the practice for
the contractor to pay the progress payments into his account which
was operated on an overdraft, and from a fresh extension of credit
to pay his subcontractors. Consequently, the bank had reason to
believe that the subcontractors had not been paid and knew that
the trust funds were to be paid into the account and to be applied
specifically against the overdraft and no further extension of credit
would be allowed. The specific appropriation of the funds by the bank
is a factor from which a knowledge on the part of the bank of the
contractor's precarious financial situation, and hence a breach of
trust may be deduced.
The core of this problem is whether in all circumstances the
payment of the money by the contractor into his account is an appro-
priation in breach of trust. When the problem is examined from the
aspect of the legal nature of a bank deposit-which constitutes a
transfer of the property in the money and makes the bank the debtor
of the depositor-it is difficult to assert that one of the purposes of
the trust is to make a loan to a third party. However, from an
economic point of view, a company maintains a bank account to
enable it to preserve orderly accounts without the necessity of keep-
ing all its capital ,in cash on hand, and a contractor who had just
deposited a cheque covering payment on a construction project into
his account in order that he might draw on it in favour of his sup-
pliers and workmen, would find it startling indeed were it suggested
to him that he was thereby guilty of a breach of trust and liable to
amercement. What then is the nature of this trust created by The
61 Ibid., at p. 139.
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Mechanics' Lien Act? An American writer in considering the trust
fund provisions of the New York Lien Law has stated:
The trust created by the lien law has, however, very different properties
from the ordinary trust. The trustee of an express trust may not
commingle trust funds with his general funds. He must treat all bene-
ficiaries of the same class with strict impartiality. The crime of diversion
is committed the instant he uses the funds for an improper purpose.
None of the above statements apply to a lien law trustee. He may
commingle with impunity, favour one trust claimant over all others,
and cannot be indicted for abstracting funds if he promptly repays the
money.6 2
Although accurate in some respects, as a whole, this assessment is
of questionable validity when applied to a consideration of Canadian
mechanics' lien legislation. In the Supreme Court of Canada, Mart-
land J. asserted:
by virtue of the operation of s. 3 of the Mechanics' Lien Act R.S.O. 1950,
c. 227, the contractor became a trustee of the same money for the benefit
of unpaid subcontractors, etc. This section does not purport to do more
than to create a trust for the benefit of the class named in it. It does not
create a statutory lien upon the sums received by a contractor. It makes
him a trustee of that fund. Although the trust is created by statute, It
thereupon becomes subject to the application of the rules of equity
applicable to trusts. 63
Does this therefore mean that a contractor who receives a progress
payment and deposits the cheque to his general account prior to
paying his subcontractors, suppliers and workmen is to be considered
in the same light as a solicitor who mingles funds held on trust for
his client with his own moneys? Does a bank become a participator
in a breach of trust the moment that it accepts the deposit of a con-
tractor with reason to believe that suppliers and workmen have not
yet been paid, and consequently becomes liable to the unpaid suppliers
and workmen for any loss suffered by them even though it believed
that the holdback was sufficient to cover their claims? Locke J. in
his dissenting judgment thought otherwise:
The right of the subcontractors is not "an equitable right" as has been
suggested. It is a statutory right conferred by s. 3.64
This conflict of view over the nature of the remedy created by the
trust fund provision of The Mechanics' Lien Act underlines the basic
inadequacy, in the complex and ever-changing field of commercial
relations, of a concept which has proved to be of immeasurable value
in other areas of the law. It is submitted that the only viable approach
in the definition of the nature of this remedy is that taken by Locke J.
and that even if it adds another category of trust to the law, it has
the advantage of sloughing off the encrustations which preceding
centuries have, in other circumstances, and for other purposes, at-
tached to the concept of trust. The recognition of the statutory basis
of this remedy will permit its development within the context, and
62 Howard L. Meyer, Trust Fund Provisions of the N.Y. Mechanics' Lien
Law (1960-61), 10 Buffalo Law Rev. 314, at p. 325.
63 John M. M. Troup Ltd. v. RoyaZ Bank of Canada, [1962] S.C.R. 487,
at p. 505.
64 Ibid., at p. 499.
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for the purposes, for which it was created, without doing violence to
the definition of an institution which must answer other needs in
other circumstances.
65
The question of the precise degree of knowledge required to
make a bank a guilty participator in a breach of trust depends,
therefore, on the nature of the "trust" created by s. 3 of The Mech-
anics' Lien Act and this issue has not yet been definitively considered
by the Courts. The weight of judicial authority, however, leans to-
wards the view that before a bank or payee is guilty of participation
in a breach of trust, not only must it have reason to believe that
the moneys are the proceeds of a construction contract and that
suppliers, subcontractors and workmen have not been paid but also
that the contractor is in financial difficulty and is unlikely to be able
to meet his obligations.
2. Payment Into a Bank Account
There is a series of cases in which the contractor deposited
money into his overdrawn account in the ordinary course of his
business and the bank, which automatically credited the deposit
against the overdraft, was exonerated from liability for breach of
trust. In Standard Electric Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada66 the con-
tractor, who operated his account at a widely fluctuating overdraft,
one month before his bankruptcy, made a substantial deposit of
moneys received on a construction contract. At the time of the
deposit, the bank had no reason to believe that the contractor was in
financial difficulty, nor did the bank at any time press the contractor
for payment. The plaintiff, a subcontractor on the project, claimed
that the bank had applied the progress payment against the over-
draft, in breach of the trust created by s. 3 of The Mechanics' Lien
Act. The trial judge held that the Bank Act, s. 96(1),67 applied
to a situation of this kind where trust moneys were paid into the
account of the contractor or builder and paid out from time to time
in the ordinary course of business. The determining factor in the
65 In Re Mann Constnction Ltd., [19651 2 O.R. 655, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 580,
(Ont. H.C.), the contractor, upon completion of the construction project, on
which one of his subcontractors defaulted owing to bankruptcy, had in its
hands $3,870 due to the bankrupt subcontractor. The contractor was besieged
by the trustee in bankruptcy and the creditors of the bankrupt all demanding
payment. The contractor availed itself of s. 60(1) of The Trustee Act, R.S.O.
1960, c. 408, and applied to the Court for direction. The application was
dismissed on the grounds that a statute by operation of which a trust is
created is not an "instrument" within the meaning of the word as used in
Rr. 607 and 611 (Ont), and the applicant could not bring an application
under s. 60 of The Trustee Act to determine legal rights, e.g. competing
claims to money in its hands.
R. 607 also has no application to a trustee under The Bulk Sales Act:
Re Langdon (1919), 46 O.L.R. 555. (Ont. H.C.).
Although the decision can be explained on the grounds that Rr. 607 and
611 (Ont.) envisage a specific trust created by a specific instrument-and
hence'the decision would have been the same in the case of an oral trust-
it is submitted that there is latent in the decision an awareness that a trust
created by statute is not "a trust like other trusts".
66 [19601 O.W.N. 367 (Ont. H.C.).
67 S.C., 1953-1954, c. 48.
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view of the trial judge was whether "the payment or deposit to the
credit of the account was designed or intended to be a payment for
the benefit of the bank for a debt due to it on an overdraft, or was
a deposit to the credit of the account in the ordinary course of
business. ' 68 He pointed out that it would be impracticable for the
bank to make inquiry as to whether or not the subcontractors who
had done the work which earned this deposit had been paid in whole
or in part by the contractor, and a bank account could not be operated
on such a basis. There was nothing unusual to put the bank on in-
quiry.
6 9
This same problem came before the Supreme Court of Canada
in the case of John M. M. Troup Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada.70 A
contractor received a cheque for $77,000, the major portion of the
holdback, and deposited it in his account which was overdrawn
$109,000. As security for the overdraft the bank held $95,000 in
government bonds, an assignment of book debts, a guarantee of
another company and personal guarantees. At the time $50,000 of
the bonds were liquidated and the proceeds together with the de-
posit eliminated the overdraft. The action was launched by a sub-
contractor who had not been paid. Judson J. pointed out that the
extent of the bank's knowledge at the time of the deposit was that
it knew the cheque had been received as part of the contract price
on a construction project but it had no knowledge of any unpaid
accounts of any subcontractors nor of any financial difficulties of the
contractor, nor had it any reason to suspect that the deposit in the
current account of the customer was an appropriation or conversion
of any part of the contract price to any use not authorized by s. 3
of the Act.71 Under the circumstances, the bank could not be charged
with notice of a breach of trust. The Fonthill Lumber Ltd. case 72 was
distinguished by Judson J. who declared, that it had been based
upon proof of knowledge of the existence of the trust under s. 3(1)
and knowledge of the commission of a breach of trust.
There was in this case an assignment of book debts to the bank
but the County of Lambton, for whom the work was being done, had
not been given notification of the assignment. The Court was
divided on the question of the relevance of the assignment to the
issue but they agreed in the result. Counsel for the subcontractor
ably argued that although the bank did not attempt to enforce the
assignment, it was nevertheless an existing and valid instrument.
7 3
68 Supra, footnote 66, at p. 369.
69 The bank had been given a general assignment of book debts, but the
bank was not making a claim as an assignee, nor was the deposit so made.
70 Supra, footnote 63. For a comment, see 21 U of T Fac L Rev 135.
71 Ibid., at p. 492.
72 Supra, footnote 49.
73 It was argued that any money received by the contractor was by the
express terms of the assignment-"all moneys received by the undersigned
from the collection of the debts or any of them shall be received in trust
for the Bank"-received as trustee or agent of the bank. The contractor
knew of the unpaid subcontractors, and as agent his knowledge must be
attributed to the bank, who therefore had notice of the breach of trust.
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Judson J. rejected the relevance of the assignment in holding that
the bank did not receive the cheque under the assignment because
notice of the assignment had not been given to the County of Lamb-
ton, and it could have no effect on a payment made in the ordinary
course of business by the County to the contractor. Cartwright J.
found that when the money was deposited into the overdrawn account,
neither the bank nor the construction company were acting in pur-
suance of the assignment but as banker and customer in the ordinary
course of business, and therefore, the plaintiff's argument failed on
the factsJ 4 Martland and Ritchie JJ. met the plaintiff's argument
head on and agreed that the contractor had in accordance with the
terms of the assignment received the cheque in trust for the bank
but subject to the prior trust created by The Mechanics' Lien Act,
s. 3(1). On paying the cheque into the account, what occurred was
that the bank which initially had only an equitable right, subordinate
to that of the subcontractor, acquired legal title to the money, bona
fide, for value, without notice of any breach of trust on the part of
the contractor.
Where a trustee has overdrawn his banking account, his bankers have
a first and paramount legal lien on all moneys paid in by him, unless
they have notice, not only that they are trust moneys, but also that the
payment to them constitutes a breach of trust.75
In Canadian Pittsburgh Industries Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia
76
Collins J. abstracted five significant factors from the Troup case:
(1) the banker was not aware of any actual or intended breach of
trust by the builder; (2) the owner did not pay the $77,000 directly
to the banker by reason of the assignment, or at all; (3) the owner
paid the money to the builder who deposited it with his banker in
the ordinary course of business; (4) although the banker had knowl-
edge that the deposit was a substantial part of the holdback arising
from a building contract, he did not know that the remainder of the
holdback was insufficient to pay in full accounts, if any, of the plaintiff
or other subcontractors; (5) the banker received the cheque from the
builder for value in the ordinary course of business in pursuance of a
banker and customer relationship. He concluded that where these
factors exist, in the absence of any other significant factor, receipt
by a banker of a builder's deposit in the ordinary course of business
and its application in reduction of an overdraft does not result in
participation by the banker in any actual or intended breach of trust
on the part of the builder. Thus, where a contractor deposited money
into an overdrawn account in the ordinary course of business, and
then absconded, the bank, which realized that there were probably
some materialmen who had not been paid, but believed that the
holdback would be substantial and sufficient to pay off any sub-
74 Cartwright J. alternatively relied on Cave v. Cave (1880), 15 Ch.D. 639
as authority for the proposition that knowledge on the part of an agent will
not to be imputed to his principal where the agent is party to a fraud of which
the principal is ignorant and which would be exposed if the agent communi-
cated the notice to his principal.
75 Supra, footnote 63, at p. 506.
76 Supra, footnote 59.
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contractors or materialmen, did not act in breach of trust in appropri-
ating the money against the overdraft. 7 Similarly, where the owner
provides the contractor with funds to pay for materials to be used
in the construction, and the contractor wrongfully uses the money
to wipe out an overdraft in his bank account and to pay off his
indebtedness to another supplier for goods supplied on a different
building project, the owner is in no better position than any other
cestui que trust 8
The recent case of Pilkington Glass Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce 9 injects a disquieting note into this general
scheme of the consequences attendant upon an assignment of trust
moneys and payment in the general course of a banker-customer
relationship. In this case the contractor, who had a 'revolving credit
arrangement' with the bank, made an assignment to the bank of
moneys owed to him by the local School Board on a building project,
of which notice was given to the School Board. 0 The latter drew some
of the cheques payable to the contractor and others payable to the
bank. The contractor endorsed all the cheques, irrespective of to
whom they were made payable, and deposited them into his over-
drawn account. Counsel for the unpaid subcontractor argued that
the bank "made a boo boo" 81 by taking an assignment and that
the cheques made payable to the bank represented trust moneys
which the bank had wrongfully applied in reduction of the con-
tractor's indebtedness. In a manner not calculated to win favour for
his cause, which to the trial judge appeared to be "based upon grounds
which admittedly are very narrow and highly technical in nature",82
counsel volunteered his opinion that "the smart thing for the banks
to do is not to take an assignment". 83 To this argument Sullivan
J. replied:
I do not subscribe to the view that justice is to be weighed by any test
of "smartness". I think that good faith and bona fides provide the better
test.84
The learned trial judge did not pursue this avenue further but held
that cases like Minneapolis-Honeywell were not of great assistance in
these circumstances "because they relate to claims of outside creditor-
assignees whose position is not comparable to that of a banker in over-
draft position who seeks to continue a 'revolving credit' arrangement
with his customer". 85 Sullivan J. found as a fact that all dealings by
the bank with the contractor, were conducted in the ordinary course
of banker-customer relations. The trial judge's interpretation of the
77 Ibid.
78 Drew v. Royal Bank of Canada, (1963), 42 W.W.R. 166 (B.C. S.C.).
79 (1964), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 504 (B.C. S.C.). See 22 U of T Fac L Rev 107.
80 The original notice of assignment was defective in form although the
School Board acted on it; a new notice was given and at least one of the
cheques made payable to the bank was paid after that date.
81 Supra, footnote 79, at p. 509.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., at p. 510.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., at p. 513.
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facts and some obiter dicta are open to question, but once it is
accepted that the money was paid into the account in a banker-
customer relationship and not in pursuit of an assignment, then
the Court's conclusions are unassailable.
This matter again became a subject of judicial consideration in
Geo. W. Crothers Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia 6 where the delinquent
contractor had made an assignment of his book debts to the bank
and upon the bank giving notice of the assignment most of the pay-
ments under the contract were in fact made by cheques payable
jointly to the contractor and the bank-"a course of action which",
Schatz J. recognized, "could only be a direct result of the assign-
ment";8 7 however, the cheques were delivered to the contractor who
deposited them to his account. The court agreed that "the assignment
was acted upon and was effective as an assignment"8 8 but asserted
that the position taken by the debtor could have no bearing upon
its effect as between assignor and an assignee and that the payments
received by the contractor were deposited into his account in the
ordinary course of business notwithstanding the facts in respect to
an assignment. Schatz J. referred to a passage in the judgment of
Cartwright J. in John M. M. Troup Ltd. v. RoyaZ Bank of Canada8 9
in which the learned Justice stated that he did not think the assign-
ment relevant because neither party acted upon it.90 Schatz J. did
"not consider such facts91 to be of sufficient weight to override the
evidence of normal operation of the account in the ordinary course
of business." 92 He notes that this conclusion was also reached in the
case of Canadian Pittsburgh Industries Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia
93
and also relies on the view stated by Sullivan J. in Pilkington Glass
86 (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 481 (Ont. H.C.).
87 Ibid., at p. 485.
88 Ibid.
89 Supra, footnote 63, at p. 491.
90 Schatz J. lays particular emphasis on Cartwright J.'s concluding
words: "In view of the manner in which the dealings between the bank and
the construction company were carried on the existence of the assignment
appears to me to be irrelevant." It is respectfully submitted that the learned
trial judge's reasoning is based on a misapprehension of the effect of Cart-
wright J.'s decision. The Troup case does not stand for the proposition that
where a bank is concerned, an assignment is irrelevant, and where the
assignee is not a bank (MinneapoZis-Honeywell), the assignment is decisive,
but merely that on the facts of that particular case none of the parties acted
on the assignment which was in effect a dead letter. See Cartwright J. at
p. 491: "The argument that the bank received it qua assignee or qua cestui
que trust appears to me to fail on the facts. Neither the county nor the
plaintiffs [i.e. claimants under s. 3] were aware of or parties to the assign-
ment; the only parties to it were the bank and the construction company and
so long as the former saw fit to refrain from acting upon it I am unable to
see how the mere fact of its existence could improve the position of the
plaintiffs." Schatz J. is making a proposition of law out of a finding of fact.
91 I.e. the existence of an assignment, notice by the bank to the general
contractor, payment of the cheques to the contractor and bank jointly.
92 Supra, footnote 86, at p. 486.
93 Supra, footnote 59. Where the assignment in express terms made the
assignor agent of the bank to receive the moneys due under the assignment
and the contractor did in fact receive the moneys and deposited them into
his overdrawn account, the court found that the parties were not acting under
the assignment.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.94 Schatz J. goes on to
state that "even if the bank became a trustee by reason of the
assignment there has been no breach of trust by the bank" and in
support of this conclusion he relies on the decision of the Court of
Appeal in John Ritchie Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce95
which he states "held that the bank was entitled to repay to itself,
from the moneys in the account, for the moneys advanced by the
bank to the account".96 However, the key to that decision rests on
the fact that the contractor had expended his own funds in excess
of the progress payments received and was entitled, without com-
mitting any breach of trust, to reimburse himself from the moneys
received, which he in fact did by paying them into his account and
which the bank applied against his overdraft. It is no answer to
claim that the moneys advanced by the bank were used by the con-
tractor in the construction project since the bank is not a "supplier"
within the meaning of the Act and is not entitled to stand in the
shoes of the contractor.97 Schatz J. observed that more moneys were
paid out of the account to persons entitled under the contract than
were received by the contractor under the contract, and that there
was no requirement that the moneys be disbursed proportionately
to those entitled on the contract. He therefore considered it "un-
necessary and unjustifiable to direct a reference to determine whether
moneys deposited in the account were used to pay persons other
than those entitled under the trust in respect of this contract"98
-although this is precisely what occurred in the Minneapolis-Honey-
well case99 -because it would be impracticable to carry on a banking
business for such contractors if the banks were obligated to police
such account and verify the validity of each cheque passing through
it. Schatz J. finds:
The moneys due to Robinson were deposited in the bank account in the
ordinary course of business and not as a result of the assignment by
Robinson to the Bank.10 0
On the basis of this finding of fact, which is difficult to reconcile with
the evidence, the result of the case is unobjectionable.
From these last few cases a trend emerges degrading the sig-
nificance of an assignment where payment has already been made to
a bank, which had no knowledge of the breach of trust. Until recently,
94 Supra, footnote 79. "I do not think that anything turns upon the cir-
cumstances just related i.e. the existence of the assignment, and the issue of
the cheques, made payable to the bank, but delivered to the contractor, who
endorsed them and personally deposited them to the credit of his current
account because in my view (whether or not the bank was 'smart' in taking
the assignment and giving notice thereof) the relationship of banker and
customer doing business upon a 'revolving credit' arrangement of ordinary
business accommodation, was not disturbed". p. 513 D.L.R., 354 W.W.R., 271
C.B.R.
95 [1965] 1 O.R. 197, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 289, 6 C.B.R. (N.S.) 312.
96 Supra, footnote 86, at p. 488.
97 Re Walter Davidson Company, [1957] O.W.N. 223.
98 (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 481, at p. 488.
99 Supra, footnote 2.
100 Ibid., at p. 489.
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very little attention was devoted to the exact meaning of the phrase
"in the ordinary course of business" where a bank was concerned. A
dichotomy was established between moneys received by virtue of an
assignment and cash or negotiable instruments paid over the counter
in a creditor-debtor relationship, and only the latter constituted a
banker-customer relationship. Such a position fails, however, to take
cognizance of economic reality which is abundantly clear from the
number of cases in which an assignment existed alongside of payment
by the depositor of money over the counter. Banks are not merely
borrowers or stakeholders of their customers but also play an im-
portant role in financing the business enterprises of their customers.
A revolving credit arrangement of ordinary business accommodation,
secured by an assignment of book debts, is no less a part of "the
ordinary course of business" of a bank than is the payment of specie
by a depositor into a savings account, thus creating the bank his
debtor. The traditional concept of the assignment and its attendant
consequences of nemo dat quod non habet, as well as the effect of the
payment of money of a debtor to a creditor who receives it in good
faith and for value thus overriding all equities, have impeded the
development of the law in this area and have proved to be the source
of considerable confusion. Once the Supreme Court of Canada decided
in the Troup case' 01 that the payment had not been made in pursuance
of the assignment, which was therefore irrelevant, but in the ordinary
course of a banker-customer relationship, the result of the contest
between claimants under s. 3 and the bank, in the words of Sullivan J.,
depends on very narrow and highly technical grounds indeed. 102
Subsequent decisions1 03 have extended this principle of ignoring
the assignment 04 by findings of fact in the teeth of the evidence,
where the document of assignment expressly constituted the con-
tractor an agent for the bank to receive the moneys, 05 and where
cheques were, in compliance with the assignment, made payable either
to the bank' 06 or to the contractor and bank jointly, 07 but delivered
to the contractor who deposited them into his account.
The state of the law at the present time appears to be that a
bank cannot rely on an assignment in claiming priority over a supplier
or workman,108 but where the money has actually been paid into the
account, the existence of an assignment and action by the debtor
under it, at least where he delivers the cheques to the contractor who
deposits them, will prove no embarrassment to the bank, which had
101 Supra, footnote 70.
102 Pilkington Glass Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, supra,
footnote 79.
103 All of them High Court decisions.
104 In the Troup case the decision could be justified on the facts and in
the cogent reasoning of Martland J. of what would have been the result if
effect were given to the express terms of the assignment.
105 Canadian Pittsburgh Industries Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, supra,
footnote 59.
106 Pilkington Glass Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, supra,
footnote 79.
107 Geo. W. Crothers Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, supra, footnote 86.
108 Royal Bank of Canada v. Blick, Wilson et a7., supra, footnote 17.
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no reasonable grounds for suspecting a breach of trust on the part
of the contractor. 10 9 Although the courts state that the deposit was
made in the ordinary course of business, implicit in the reasoning
of the judgments and the obiter dicta is a broadening concept of what
constitutes the ordinary course of a banker's business and a gradual
assimilation, where a bank is concerned, of an assignment of moneys
due under a construction contract, and their payment into the account
in a creditor-debtor relationship. Such a course recognizes the
economic reality of revolving credit arrangements of business accom-
modation and the bank's desire to have some security in the nature
of an assignment of book debts. The refusal of the courts on the one
hand to adhere strictly, in deed as well as word, to the dichotomy
of assignment-payment in the course of business, and on the other
hand, their inability to break away completely from these traditional
strictures, have relegated this problem to a twilight zone which is
bound to provoke further litigation. A greater degree of certainty
would be introduced into this area of the law by appropriate legisla-
tion which would recognize the substantial effect of these cases
by providing that where money has been paid into a bank account
by assignment or otherwise, claimants under s. 3 of The Mechanics'
Lien Act have no claim against the bank unless the latter knowingly
and deliberately participated in a breach of trust in applying the
money against an overdraft. 1 0
109 Canadian Pittsburgh Industries Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, supra,
footnote 59; John M. M. Troup Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, supra, footnote
63; Pilkington Glass Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, supra,
footnote 79; Geo. W. Crothers Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, supra, footnote 86.
110 It is interesting to note how New York State resolved this problem.
The experience there was that banks would often finance a contractor on a
specific construction project and provide him with funds with which to pay
his suppliers, and take back as security an assignment of all moneys to
become due by reason of the construction; the contractor, however, would
take the money provided by the bank and expend it elsewhere meanwhile
subcontracting out large portions of the work and providing the materials
for the improvement by receiving credit from suppliers. When the time came
for payment, the subcontractor and supplier found that the funds due from
the owner or contractor to their debtor had been assigned away to a bank.
As early as 1896 the Legislature required the registration of such assign-
ments and failure to register not only invalidated the assignments as regards
future payments but also required the lender to disgorge to the suppliers,
subcontractors and workmen any sums he had collected under the unregis-
tered assignment. See §73 New York Lien Law: "A party who takes as
security an assignment of trust funds to become due must file a 'notice of
lending' with the County Clerk wherein the property giving rise to the trust
is located, or if a public improvement, with the head of the department
having charge of the work and the disbursing officer. Also the assignee must
prove that the moneys he advanced in consideration of the assignment were
in fact used to discharge trust claims. If all of the above requirements are
not met, the assignment falls and the amounts the builder received there-
under must be returned to the proper trust claimants." There were two lines
of authority relating to the consequences of this section. One line of cases
afforded the lender who had failed to register an equitable set off to the
amount he could prove his borrower had in fact used to discharge trust
claims. Another line of cases required as a prerequisite to the retention of
any moneys, the proper filing of the assignment. In 1959 the law was amended
to require that not only must the lender properly file his assignment but
must also see that the money he lends in fact goes to pay trust claims.
[footnote continued on next page.]
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Conflict With Other Provisions of the Act
The possibility of conflict between s. 3 (1) and another provision
of The Mechanics' Lien Act arose in an action between a bank, holding
a general assignment of book debts from a contractor, and a sub-
contractor who had supplied materials in the construction of sewers
and water mains under a public highway."' The bank claimed that
the Act did not apply to the circumstances of this case" 2 and relied
on s. 2 of the Act which provides:
Nothing in this Act extends to any public street or highway, or to any
work or improvement done or caused to be done by a municipal corpora-
tion thereon.113
In the Supreme Court of Canada it was decided that the remedy
provided by s. 3 was wholly independent of the general lien created by
s. 5 of the Act, and the purpose and effect of s. 2 was merely to remove
certain works from the consequences of the imposition of a lien on
the work. The Court was not prepared seriously to contemplate the
piecemeal dismemberment and sale of a public highway to realize
a private debt.
What is aimed at by s. 2 is a provision producing a property effect upon
a highway: there is no concern with an enumeration for descriptive
purposes of kinds of work on lands generally to which the statute annexes
certain legal consequences. The word "highway" in s. 2 does not include
a contract for work on a highway or moneys payable under it. The only
statutory effect of the Act that, in the proper sense, could extend to the
"highway", as a physical object, is the lien;114
The Court emphasized that the trust fund provision deals with the
"contractor" in a new aspect. Where there is a contract for a work
mentioned in s. 5 the trust fund provision creates the equivalent of
a lien on the moneys. The two securities, that is, the land and the
money are completely independent of one another. The object of the
trust fund provision was to give to suppliers and workmen a remedy
On this side of the border not only may a bank not rely on an assign-
ment to claim for moneys which it had advanced to a contractor and which
had actually been expended on the construction project (See Re Walter
Davidson, supra, footnote 97), although it may recoup itself to the extent of
any moneys the contractor expended on the project from any payment
actually received by him (See John Ritchie Ltd. v. Canadian Bank of Com-
merce, [19651 1 O.R. 197, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 289, 6 C.B.R. 312), but the prior
registration of an assignment of book debts in compliance with local legis-
lation provides no protection against claims brought under s. 3 of the
Mechanics' Lien Act (See Re Bishop, Rowe & Spaith Construction Co. Ltd.
(1961), 35 W.W.R. 20 (Alta. S.C.)).
111 Canadian Bank of Commerce v. McAvity & Sons Ltd. (1959), 17 D.L.R.
(2d) 529 (S.C.C.).
112 See also Geo. W. Crothers Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, supra, foot-
note 86, where the work was done on Crown lands and the lien provisions of
the Act were unavailable to the plaintiff, who therefore brought his action
under s. 3. See also Wells H. Morton & Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Credit Men's
Trust Association (1966), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 625 (Man. C.A.). In Regina v. Cana-
dian Indemnity Company Limited (1964), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 617, at p. 645, Nikit-
man J. held that the Crown was a "person" within the meaning of s. 3 of
the Builders and Workmen Act, R.S. . 1954, c. 28, and therefore the money
paid by the Crown to the trustee in bankruptcy of a contractor was subject
to the statutory trust in favour of subcontractors, suppliers and workmen.
113 R.S.O. 1950, c. 227, s. 2.
114 Supra, footnote 111, at pp. 531, 532.
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supplemental to the security on the land itself which might be brought
to an end by the price being paid in full to the contractor. It appeared
to the Court that "it would defeat that fundamental object of the
statute to deny this trust to workmen on a work on a highway and
leave them without any security whatever, while giving additional
security to those already entitled to a lien". 15
In Bankh of Montreal v. Township of Sidney 16 one of the argu-
ments raised by the bank was that s. 13(1)117 which stated that
a lien was to have "priority over all judgments, executions, assign-
ments . . . issued or made after the lien arises . . ." impliedly ex-
cluded an assignment made before the lien arose from the application
of the section. LeBel J. looked to the context in which the word
"assignment" appeared, that is, among certain kinds of judicial
process, and decided that it did not refer to equitable or statutory
assignments of money but an assignment in the nature of an assign-
ment in bankruptcy; in any event, the section did not say that to
secure priority the lien must arise before an assignment. If that were
the case, the whole object of the Act would be defeated. 118
Distribution of Trust Fund
In Minneapolis-Honeywell Ltd. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. Ltd."19
Rand J. stated:
Section 3 does not require that the moneys be distributed on a pro rata
basis. The subcontractor has, in this respect a discretionary power, and
his obligation is satisfied when the trust moneys are paid out to persons
entitled, whatever their division.
120
This is a reasonable and practicable rule where the payments are
made out of the trust moneys while the contractor operates a going
concern, or, as in the facts of this case, an assignee is fixed with a
transmitted fiduciary obligation; however, different considerations
may well arise where the contractor knows that he is on the verge
of bankruptcy and attempts to make a fraudulent preference in
favour of certain creditors. In that event a discretionary power of
115 Ibid., at p. 532.
116 Supra, footnote 12. The facts of the case are given supra at p. 80.
117 R.S.O. 1950, c. 227, s. 13(1). "The lien has priority over all judgments,
executions, assignments, attachments, garnishments, and receiving orders
recovered, issued or made after the lien arises, and over all payments or
advances made on account of any conveyance or mortgage after notice in
writing of the lien has been given at the address endorsed on such convey-
ance or mortgage pursuant to section 45 of The Registry Act to the person
making such payments or after registration of a claim for the lien as
hereinafter provided, and in the absence of such notice in writing or the
registration of a claim for lien all such payments or advances have priority
over any such lien."
118 Supra, footnote 12, at p. 582.
119 Supra, footnote 2.
120 Ibid., at p. 697.
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distribution might involve a conflict with the purpose behind bank-
ruptcy legislation and work an injustice.
12'
It is clear that where money subject to the trust fund provision
has been paid into court upon the contractor's bankruptcy, it will
be distributed rateably among the suppliers and subcontractors.
Equity requires that the payments should be made rateably when the
situation arises that there will be a deficiency and while the trustee in
bankruptcy in a sense stands in the same position as the debtor, i.e. the
bankrupt debtor, nevertheless in such circumstances, as trustee of this
fund, he is bound in equity to distribute the same rateably among the
creditors whose claims are for material and work on the construction in
question and without regard to the assignment to one creditor.122
S. 3 of The Mechanics' Lien Act establishes a trust but makes no
provision as to how the trust is to be administered. In the Davidson'2
and Putherbough'24 cases a reference was directed. If the fund is
small, this procedure is impractical. As an alternative it is possible,
if only three or four creditors are involved, to have the trustee dis-
tribute the funds after first obtaining from the creditors concerned,
an agreement to indemnify the trustee if other claims appear.
125
Miscellaneous
In the British Columbia case of Scott and Scott v. Riehl and
Schumak"26 the plaintiffs entered into a contract with Schumak &
Riehl Builders Ltd. for the construction of a house. Upon completion
and payment of the price, the plaintiffs discovered that the com-
pany had not paid for labour and materials going into the building,
and mechanics' liens totalling $6,447.51 had been filed. Plaintiffs
negotiated a settlement of the claims and then, relying on s. 3 (1),127
sued personally the directors of the two-man company, which by
then had been declared bankrupt. The Court noted that the plain-
tiffs as owners were within the classes of cestuis que trustent named
121 Once the contractor becomes bankrupt, the balance of the contract
moneys owing, held by the owner, vest in the trustee in bankruptcy and
must be paid over to him. The responsibility of the trustee in bankruptcy is
governed by s. 39 of the Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 14, and the trust
fund provision of The Mechanics' Lien Act. The money is divisible among
those entitled to it by virtue of the mechanics' lien legislation. See Regina v.
Canadian Indemnity Compvny Limited, supra, footnote 112, at pp. 643, 644;
RoyaZ Bank of Canada v. Wilson (1963), 42 W.W.R. 1 (Man. C.A.).
122 Re Putherboug Construction Co. Ltd., 37 C.B.R. 6, at p. 7.
123 Re WaLter Davidson Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 97.
124 Re Putherbough Construction Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 122.
125 See Lloyd W. Houlden, Comment, 37 C.B.R. 10.
126 (1958), 25 W.W.R. 525 (B.C. S.C.).
127 R.S.B.C. 1956, c. 27, s. 3(1). "All sums received by a contractor or
subcontractor on account of the contract price shall be and constitute a trust
fund in the hands of the contractor or of the subcontractor, as the case may
be, for the benefit of the owner, contractor, subcontractor, Workmen's Com-
pensation Board, workmen, and materialmen; and the contractor or the
subcontractor, as the case may be, shall be the trustee of all such sums so
received by him, and, until all workmen and all materialmen and all sub-
contractors are paid for work done or material supplied on the contract and
the Workmen's Compensation Board is paid any assessment with respect
thereto shall not appropriate or convert any part thereof to his own use, or
to any use not authorized by the trust." Itaics mine.
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in the section. 128 The plaintiffs claimed that the moneys received
by the company were trust moneys held by the company as trustee
for the benefit of the plaintiffs and all other beneficiaries named
in s. 3 (1), and that the money had not been applied on those trusts
but had been appropriated to uses not authorized by The Mechanics'
Lien Act. The moneys had been paid into the company's general
account which was always overdrawn and from which were paid
all the company's general expenses. The Court found that since Riehl
had opened the account and directed its use,
he knew that moneys deposited, such as those received from the plaintiffs,
must be used for the general purposes of the company in abuse of the
trust created by s. 3 of the Mechanics' Lien Act. He knowingly created,
maintained and operated this unlawful system. The company was the
instrument of its operation, but he was the director. Directors may be
liable to third parties for a company's wrongdoing if they have expressly
authorized the wrongful acts complained of.129
The director, Riehl, became a trustee de son tort by his participation
in the breach of trust and was personally liable for the loss caused
to the owner.
1 30
The decision in this case extends the range of parties against
whom the damnified cestui que trust may have recourse. Since it is a
universal practice for construction companies to operate their business
with a general account 31 the officer of the company receiving the
cheque from an owner and authorizing its payment into the company
account would find himself personally liable for any damage resulting
to the owner caused by unpaid workmen or suppliers registering liens
against the property, where he knew that the workmen and suppliers
had not been paid. 3 2 It is difficult to envisage circumstances, even in
a large company, where the officer charged therewith would not be
aware of the state of the company's accounts. As for the plethora
of small one-man construction companies, the corporate veil would
prove to be no protection against a wide variety of creditors, since
there is no reason why this remedy should not be available to the
other cestuis que trustent, the unpaid suppliers, subcontractors and
workmen, as well as to the owner.
Where the trustee in bankruptcy pays moneys subject to the
trust fund created by s. 3(1) into a bank account, the interest
collected on the fund while awaiting disposition at trial belongs to
128 In the corresponding section in the Ontario Act, the word "proprietor"
is used. See R.S.O. 1960, c. 233, s. 3(1).
129 (1958), 25 W.W.R. 525, at p. 527.
130 33 Halsbury 326, 307; Minneapolis-Honeywell Ltd. v. Empire Brass
Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1954), 11 W.W.R. (N.S.) 212, at p. 223 per Davey J.; Rainham
Chemical Works Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd., [1921J 2 A.C. 465.131 E.g. see John M. M. Troup Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, supra
footnote 63; Standard Electric Co. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1960'
O.W.N. 367; John Ritchie Ltd. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, supra, foot-
note 51.
132 Presumably, the principle that an agent who commits a tort Is per-
sonally liable whether he acted on behalf of a principal or not, and even if
he acted for his principal's benefit would cover a case of breach of trust.
For a discussion of the personal liability of an agent for tortious acts, see
Powell, The Law of Agency (2d ed. 1961), pp. 277 et seq.
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the s. 3 creditors; 133 but there is no reported case which would impose
upon the contractor an obligation to pay interest on the moneys
from the time he received them until he paid them out to subcontrac-
tors and suppliers.
Where the trustee in bankruptcy of a contractor received moneys
from one subcontractor in settlement of an action for breach of con-
tract, another subcontractor who completed the originally defective
work was not entitled to base a claim against the moneys on s. 3(1)
because they were not "moneys received on account of the contract
price".134 A sum received by way of damages for breach of contract
does not constitute money received on account of the contract price.
There may be situations where the contractor receives refunds on
account of a deposit made, or the return of certain sums placed as
security.135 The status of such moneys is uncertain although it
appears that they would be available for distribution to general
creditors, without priority to claimants under s. 3(1), because the
moneys were not received on account of the contract price.
Persons claiming for the rental of equipment are not beneficiaries
of the trust fund created by s. 3 (1) which affords remedy for work
done and materials supplied. 36 However, where a person supplies
equipment and operators to a contractor and himself pays the wages
of the operators and maintains such equipment at his own expense,
he properly comes within the definition of subcontractor and may
make a claim under s. 3 (1) .137
Where lien claims are registered and are admitted as valid then
claimants have a right to the whole of the moneys kept back by
the owner to the extent of their claims and costs, even where moneys
in excess of the statutory holdback have been withheld. Only if there
is a surplus over and above the amount of the liens and costs is the
money available for distribution in accordance with s. 3 of the Act. 138
Mechanics' lien claimants are, thus, the first paid out of the money
in the hands of the owner to the extent of their claims and costs.
Any surplus moneys are not trust funds until they are received
by the contractor. S. 3 does not impose a trust on owners but on
contractors and subcontractors when they have received moneys from
the owner or head contractor.1 39 In Dominion Electric Protection
Co. v. Leopold Beaudoin Construction Co.140 the plaintiff had, on the
133 In re Arthur J. Lennox Contractors Ltd. (1959), 38 C.B.R. 97.
134 In Re Williams & Williams (Eastern) Limited (1962), 3 C.B.R. 76,
and Comment.
135 Royal Bank of Canada v. Brick, Wilson et al., supra, footnote 17.
136 Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Ace Lumber Ltd., [19633 S.C.R. 110. For com-
ment, see 3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 267. In re Arthur Lennox Contractors Ltd.
(1959), 38 C.B.R. 97; Northcoast Forest Products Ltd. v. Eakins Construction
Ltd. (1960), 35 W.W.R. 233, 26 D.L.R. (2d) 251 (B.C. S.C.).
137 Re Terra Cotta Contracting Co. (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 488.
138 Rosemount Tile and Terrazzo Ltd. v. Board of Education for the Town-
ship of North, York, (1960), 1 C.B.R. 63.
139 See Lloyd W. Houlden, Comment, (1960), 1 C.B.R. 64.
140 (1963), 5 C.B.R. 72.
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order of a subcontractor, supplied and installed certain electrical
equipment in a building being constructed for the federal government.
When the subcontractor failed to pay, plaintiff obtained judgment
against the subcontractor but this too was not paid. Plaintiff then,
relying on s. 3, brought an action against the contractor. In a brief
judgment Aylen J. stated:
The section appears to be chiefly in the nature of a penal statute. There
is no doubt that defendant failed to comply with the provisions of s. 3,
and the fact that s. 3 creates a civil liability has been fully recognized
in Minneapolis-Htloneywell Ltd. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. Ltd.141
Plaintiff was able to bring an action against defendant after having
obtained judgment against the subcontractor because he relied on
separate causes of action. A comment which follows the case points
out:
It is unfortunate that Aylen J. did not spell out the manner in which
the general contractor had failed to comply with s. 3. If we assume that
the general contractor paid the subcontractor the amount owing, It
would seem from the judgment that a general contractor does not dis-
charge his trust by making payment to a subcontractor. This is indeed
a startling conclusion. 142
In upholding a conviction for breach of trust under The Mechanics'
Lien Act,143 the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Regina v.
Brunner44 ruled that the provincial enactment was not ultra vires the
province, and was not in conflict with s. 282 of the Criminal Code
respecting criminal breach of trust.
Conclusion
An examination of the litigation waged over the trust fund pro-
vision of The Mechanics' Lien Act illustrates the illusionary nature
of the simple rules that assignments are subject to equities and that
a purchaser for value without notice takes free of a trust. The con-
fusion in this area of the law is attributable to the inadequacy of
the trust concept, owing to the characteristics which became appended
to it in the course of its historical development (adequate in the times
and for the purposes it served, but failing to answer this specific pro-
blem in its twentieth century context) to meet the exigencies of
commercial transactions, coupled with an understandable reluctance
on the part of the courts to sacrifice practical business convenience for
the sake of an orderly conceptual approach to the law. The confusion
centres about the nature of the trust created by The Mechanics' Lien
Act and the consequences which flow from it. The problem is to be
resolved either by a clear and authoritative judicial definition, which,
if the law is to answer the exigencies of commercial practice, inevitably
involves the abandonment of cherished but hoary concepts, or by what
appears to be the more likely course, legislation. Nothing would be
lost by creating a lien on the moneys received by a contractor under
141 Ibid., at p. 73.
142 Ibid., at p. 75.
143 R.S.B.C. 1956, c. 27, s. 3(2).
144 (1960), 32 W.W.R. 478.
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a construction contract and imposing upon the contractor the fidu-
ciary duty to see to it that the present cestuis que trustent are paid out
of those funds, the lien to be lost when the funds are received from the
contractor by a third party for value without notice that the contractor
is acting in breach of his fiduciary duty. This would have the clear
advantage of eliminating the dichotomy in the consequences of an as-
signment and of payment, which has led judges to make findings of fact
and draw conclusions of law in spite of the evidence. A system of regis-
tration of assignments on the New York model, with the provision that
the registered assignment will have priority over the lien against
the moneys to the extent that the moneys -advanced in consideration
of the assignment were actually applied on the project, would have
a salutary effect. An exception could be made in certain socially
desirable cases, such as that of workmen, who are economically
vulnerable in that it is not as easy for them to withhold their services
when they have doubts about the solvency of their employer as it
is for a large company or bank to refuse to extend credit.
Despite these problems, the remedy afforded by the trust fund
provision of the mechanics' lien legislation has proved to be of great
advantage to subcontractors, suppliers and workmen who, through
failure to register a lien, or because a lien could not be filed against
certain property,145 would otherwise have found themselves without
a remedy. The solution to these problems lies in reform rather than
abolition, and the advocates of repeal of the trust fund provision
conjure up the image of throwing out the baby with the bath.
145 E.g. Crown lands, public streets and highways, interprovincial pipe-
lines.
